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2.1  The Issues 
Public employment accounts for about one-third of employment in Sweden 
today. Its rapid growth reflects growth in the welfare state. Beginning in the 
early 1960s, virtually all employment growth in Sweden has been the result of 
women  entering the  labor force and working  in local government jobs that 
service the welfare system. Fertility in Sweden is among the highest in Europe, 
especially considering the high female labor force participation rate. 
The rising labor force participation of women and the increasing role of the 
state in social insurance are worldwide trends in the twentieth century. But in 
few other countries has the public sector grown so fast or achieved such a large 
scale relative to the economy as in Sweden and other Scandinavian countries. 
Public employment and public outlays are from 50 to 100 percent larger than 
in most developed countries. The standard of living is high in Sweden. How- 
ever, the causal linkages from the welfare state to economic fortunes are tenu- 
ous. Sweden had achieved one of the highest per capita incomes in the world 
well before the Swedish model was implemented.  Perhaps it was the  great 
wealth generated by the Swedish economy that allowed this model to grow 
and flourish, for, while living standards are still high and generally growing, 
they have eroded relative to other wealthy nations in the past two or three de- 
cades. Economic growth in  Sweden has not kept pace with that in Europe 
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generally,  even  excluding the  severe macroeconomic  slump of  the last few 
years (Lindbeck et al. 1994). 
The economics of  the  welfare  state gives cause for concern  about these 
trends. Government expenditures account for more than 60 percent of output 
in Sweden today, much larger than every other (non-Scandinavian) rich coun- 
try (see table 2.1  j. By itself, there is nothing to suggest that the size of govern- 
ment expenditures per se affects either living standards or growth rates one 
way or another. What is important  is that government expenditures  must be 
financed by taxation. All taxes distort economic behavior and blunt the infor- 
mation content of the price system that guides individual behavior. Taxes cause 
private valuations of  taxed goods and services to differ from their true social 
costs. They introduce potential inefficiencies in an economic system. The size 
of the public sector has to be considered from both expenditure and tax sides 
simultaneously  to understand  this point. Marginal effective tax rates for the 
average citizen were 70 percent or more a few years ago, and, although they 
are somewhat smaller today, they remain extremely large relative to other rich 
countries.  I 
This paper analyzes how the welfare state interacts with the economics of 
household.  The most important  finding  is that  the welfare  state encourages 
extra production of household goods and discourages production of material 
goods. From the normative view of economic efficiency, too many people pro- 
vide paid household  (family) services for other people, and too few are em- 
ployed in the production of  material  goods. From the view of  positive  eco- 
nomic  analysis,  this  is  what  explains  the  growth  of  local  government 
employment of women and the growth of the welfare state. A rough quantita- 
tive assessment of the distorting effects of financing child care suggests that 
the losses may be substantial. Direct child-care subsidies in Sweden today are 
approximately SKr 60,000 (about $S,OOOj  per child per year. Unless Swedish 
women desire to purchase substantially more child-care services than current 
rules allow, the estimates imply  that  these  subsidies  result  in  large  hidden 
costs-shortfalls  of actual from potential output in the overall Swedish econ- 
omy. These policies accomplish other social goals in Sweden, but their eco- 
nomic efficiency costs must be considered in any thoroughgoing cost-benefit 
analysis of the welfare state. 
The estimated costs cover a broad range, depending on assessments of eco- 
nomic parameters, especially the elasticity of labor supply of women with chil- 
dren. These judgments differ among economists.  Nonetheless, the estimates 
presented below imply that social costs would fall if child-care subsidies were 
reduced  to some extent. These must be weighed  against political and other 
social benefits that are served by these policies. No attempt is made to do so 
1. In recent years, there has been much excellent discussion of tax wedges in Sweden. For a 
sketch of the general calculation for Sweden, see Hansson (1984). For analysis of  some compo- 
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Table 2.1  The Size of the Public Sector, Shares of Total Employment, and GDP, 
1990 (%) 
Public  Public  Public  Public 
Employment  Consumption  Investment  Outlays  Taxes 
Canada  6.6  19.8  NA  NA  36.1 
United States (1989)  14.4  17.9  1.7  36.3  29.6 
Japan  6.0  9.1  5.2  32.0  31.1 
France  25.2  18.0  NA  NA  42.6 
West Germany  15.1  18.4  2.3  NA  40.3 
Sweden  31.7  27.1  3.1  61.6  56.4 
United Kingdom  19.2  19.9  2.4  41.6  35.5 
Source: OECD national accounts. 
Nore: N.A. = not available. 
here. I hope that this work will stimulate professional thinking and debate on 
those larger questions. 
The role of the household is crucial in any economic analysis of the welfare 
state in Sweden because that is where most state activities are centered and it 
is well known that the household sector is a large component of total economic 
activity in all countries (Quah  1993; Thomas 1992). The government  is not 
involved in public production of ordinary goods and services in Sweden. The 
production sector largely is in private hands, and most commercial transactions 
are organized through private markets. Sweden maintains strong private prop- 
erty institutions, free markets in consumer and producer goods, and personal 
and political freedom, which probably has ensured that resources supplied to 
the private sector flow to their highest socially valued uses. And, although pri- 
vate business is subject to substantial regulation, it is about on the same scale 
and magnitude as in other developed market economies. Where Sweden and 
other Scandinavian states especially differ from modem Western economies is 
in a greatly  enlarged government role in household and family activities. In 
essence, Sweden has “monetized“ the household sector of its economy by sub- 
stituting publicly for privately produced household services on a grand scale 
in the past three decades.2 
The increasing market value of  women’s time is the primary cause of the 
growth of both privately and state-provided household services throughout the 
world. Rising wages and work opportunities for women have increased the cost 
of  staying home to produce household services oneself  and have decreased 
the demand for it. Fertility has declined at the same time that the labor force 
participation of women has increased in most countries. In addition, technolog- 
ical  improvements  have  made  market  production  more  efficient  than  self- 
production of many household services. For instance, changing medical tech- 
2. Lindbeck (1988)  has put it in a more dramatic way, saying that Sweden has “nationalized the 
family.” This view has greatly influenced my thinking. 82  Sherwin Rosen 
nology and longer life spans have increased the productivity and demand for 
formal medical and old-age services. The great value of  skilled labor in mod- 
ern technology requires that the fewer children we have be educated (by others) 
much more intensively than in the past. But it is exceptional that all employ- 
ment growth in the Swedish economy has been confined to the local public 
sector, that nearly all of it has been accounted for by women, and that female 
labor force participation is so large relative to fertility. 
In most other countries, a larger share of household activities is provided 
privately within the informal household sector, often in transactions that never 
appear in national accounts. In Sweden, a large fraction of women work in the 
public sector to take care of  the children of  other women who work in the 
public sector to care for the parents of the women who are looking after their 
children. If  Swedish women take care of each other’s parents in exchange for 
taking care of  each other’s children, how much additional real output comes of 
it? In order for the state to provide services socially that otherwise would be 
privately produced in the family or in the private sector, many ordinary, inher- 
ently personal activities must be reckoned in explicit monetary terms, tax reve- 
nues must be raised to finance them, and complex rules and conditions must 
be imposed to limit undesirable side effects. At the same time that Swedish 
family policy encourages high fertility and large families, other aspects of the 
welfare state encourage women to participate in the labor force and shift some 
of the costs of raising their children to others. 
The next section, section 2.2, presents some basic facts about the growth of 
public employment in Sweden and shows some details of how it has affected 
the female labor market. Section 2.3 summarizes family policies in Sweden. 
Section 2.4 sketches the economics of the household and how taxes and sub- 
sidies affect behavior, while section 2.5 presents some illustrative calculations 
of deadweight losses of these policies under various assumptions. Conclusions 
are found in section 2.6. 
Before getting into the details, it is useful to state the main ideas up front. 
Given that the labor supply activities of  women generally are thought to be 
sensitive to financial considerations and that Sweden has chosen the high-tax 
road to social welfare, the theory of the second best suggests an efficiency case 
for subsidizing child care and other complementary costs of  the labor force 
participation of  women.  Subsidies encourage the market work that income 
taxes inefficiently discourage. High  marginal income tax  rates inefficiently 
subsidize the self-production of household services because the use of  one’s 
own time in the household is tax exempt. Women (and men) spend too much 
time in the self-production of  household services that would be more effi- 
ciently rendered by  buying them in the market. For example, if the marginal 
tax rate is 50 percent, a woman who could earn SKr 120,000 in the labor mar- 
ket and has to pay SKr 60,000 for child care gets very little net monetary return 
from the transaction. Many would forgo the market opportunity and stay at 
home, even though their gross earnings and social contribution to aggregate 83  Public Employment, Taxes, and the Welfare State in Sweden 
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production might exceed social costs. This inefficiently suppresses what other- 
wise might be an active and viable private market in day care and related ser- 
vices. Subsidizing child care lowers the cost of female labor force participa- 
tion. eliminates this distortion, and improves social welfare. 
But the analysis in section 2.4 shows something more. Such subsidies intro- 
duce other distortions because they require increased taxes on other goods to 
finance them. They decrease the price and excessively increase the social de- 
mand for state-provided (i.e., subsidized) household services. Women are en- 
couraged to work too much in the state-subsidized  household  sector, taking 
care of other families' household needs, and not enough in the material goods 
sector.  There is excessive  consumption  of  child-care-related  services.  As- 
sessing the efficiency of  in-kind work  subsidies to women  therefore  comes 
down to balancing one distortion in household production against another in 
material goods consumption. 
2.2  Trends in Public Sector Wages and Employment 
Labor force surveys depict the main developments in the Swedish labor mar- 
ket during the period  1963-92  for people sixteen to sixty-four years of age.3 
Labor force participation has steadily increased (fig. 2.1) and is now at a very 
high level. Population grew at an annual average rate of 0.3 percent, but the 
3. The source in most cases is the Swedish Labor Force Surveys, which started in 1963. The 
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Fig. 2.2  Private and public employment 
labor force increased at the rate of 0.8 percent. Employment increased on aver- 
age by 0.6 percent, while the number of people working increased by only 0.4 
percent per year, similar to the rate of  growth of  the population. Temporary 
leaves (vacations, sick leave, parental leave, study leave) account for the differ- 
ence between employment and working. 
Figure 2.2 shows that local government jobs account for almost all employ- 
ment growth in Sweden. They expanded at the rate of 4.4 percent per year. 
Private sector and central government employment remained essentially flat, 
growing at only 0.1 percent per year. Local government employment growth 
is, however, slowing down, averaging 8.3 percent during 1964-72,4.9  percent 
during 1972-82,  and 0.9 percent during 1982-92. 
Figures 2.3 and 2.4 show how the gender composition of  employment has 
changed. Total employment of men was essentially the same in  1992 as in 
1963, and the number of men in different sectors also remained constant. Two- 
thirds of the men have been employed in the private sector. Male central gov- 
ernment employment has been very stable, whereas male local government 
employment has increased slightly. All aggregate employment growth can be 
attributed to women. Their annual employment growth rate was 1.5 percent, 
and, by the end of the period, the number of employed women was almost the 
same as the number of employed men. Female employment in the private sec- 
tor and in central government has been constant, so almost all employment 
growth in Sweden is due to the entry of women working in local government 
jobs. 
Employment growth for women was mainly in part-time jobs during the 85  Public Employment, Taxes, and the Welfare State in Sweden 
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Fig. 2.4  Female employment, by sector 
1960s and  1970s. However,  during  the  1980s, when annual hours worked 
started to increase, full-time employment grew, and part-time employment re- 
mained constant (fig. 2.5). These trends in hours worked are the same for men 
and women and for the private and public  sectors. Note that average hours 




al  *  1700 








government  worker 
total public  sector 
I 
II  IIIII  Ill 
63  61  67  69  7k  7h  75  77  79  8'i  8h  85  87  89  91  93 
year 
Fig. 2.5  Average hours worked per year, by sector 
throughout the period and that average hours worked in local government are 
substantially smaller than elsewhere. This is one of  the reasons why women 
are more frequently found in local government employment. However, women 
work fewer hours than men in all sectors. The difference on average is six 
hundred hours per year (fig. 2.6). 
Average hourly wage rates in central and local government have changed 
substantially relative to the private sector over the period (fig. 2.7).4 There is 
a downward trend in relative public sector wages, even though employment 
increased  substantially. The 20 percent  public  sector wage premium of  the 
mid-1960s was almost extinguished by  1976. The premium increased between 
1976 and 1982 and fell during most of the 1980s. Wages of central and local 
government follow each other closely even though local government employ- 
ment grew much faster. 
Some of these movements can be attributed to changes in the demographic 
composition of employees in the public and private sectors. Average years of 
schooling of workers increased in both sectors over the past twenty years. Edu- 
cational attainment of public sector workers in Sweden is substantially larger 
than that of private sector workers, but the gap is narrowing. In 1972, public 
employees averaged 11.04 years of schooling and private sector workers 9.35 
years. By  1992, the corresponding numbers were 12.12 and 10.91 years, re- 
4.  Average hourly wage rates are computed using data on wages and salaries and total hours 
worked among employees. The sources are the SNEP-W database (1965-69)  and unpublished 
tables (1970-)  from Statistics Sweden, both developed for a quarterly econometric model of the 
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Fig. 2.6  Average annual hours, by gender 
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Fig. 2.7  Relative hourly wages 
spectively.  The initial  18 percent  difference in  educational  attainment  fell 
smoothly and uniformly over the years to 11 percent today. 
Narrowing of  educational differences explains some of the trend in figure 
2.7. Differential hiring rates, the rapid growth of local government employees 
in the 1970s, and change in relative age structures contribute much to the rest. 88  Sherwin Rosen 
New hires tend to be younger workers, who earn less than more-experienced 
workers. The decreasing average age of workers is closely associated with rela- 
tive employment expansions and increasing age with relative declines in em- 
ployment. The average age of central government workers grew slightly over 
the period, and the average age of private  sector employees was unchanged. 
But, in local government, the average fell during 1966-80,  when employment 
was expanding so rapidly. The average age of  local government workers in- 
creased thereafter, as employment growth slowed and the day-care sector ex- 
panded. 
Figure 2.8 shows how the industrial composition of public sector employ- 
ment changed. During the  1960s and 1970s, employment in medical care and 
education increased rapidly. Since 1980, employment in education has been 
constant, and employment growth in medical care slowed down. Publicly pro- 
vided  child care for preschool children at day-care centers was 2 percent of 
public employment in the mid- 1970s but has grown explosively  ever since. 
Presently, employment in public day care is almost half as large as the educa- 
tion sector and a third of the medical care sector. It now accounts for 16 percent 
of public employment, not including those employed  in public after-school- 
hour care for schoolchildren. 
The enormous growth in day-care employment has occurred without any 
increase in the relative pay of  day-care workers. The average monthly pay of 
preschool teachers is 70 percent as large as that of white-collar manufacturing 
workers and 90 percent as large as that of blue-collar manufacturing workers. 
There are no noticeable trends here. The pay of preschool teachers compared 
Health Care 
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with female blue-collar workers in manufacturing has actually decreased. How 
was it possible to recruit women to the local government sector? If it is not the 
pay,  what has made the benefits exceed the costs in the labor supply calcula- 
tions of  women? There is no doubt that family policy programs in Sweden 
were crucial to these reallocations. 
2.3  Family Policy Programs in Sweden 
The increasing price of women’s time is the main cause of increasing female 
labor force participation,  in  Sweden and elsewhere.  However,  the  apparent 
concentration of  women in local government is pronounced in Sweden, and 
participation is large relative to fertility. The Swedish welfare state family poli- 
cies-publicly  provided child care, parental leave and parental insurance, child 
allowances and housing allowances, as well as the design of the income tax- 
have contributed to this. Sweden experienced a baby boom during the 1980s. 
In 1989, Sweden had the second highest fertility rate in Europe, next to Ireland. 
Personal Income  Taxes. Sweden changed its income tax accounting  system 
from families to individuals. In 1966, separate individual income taxation was 
made optional. It was made individual in 1971, with no exemptions or deduc- 
tions for dependents. This had a large effect on after-tax wages of “secondary” 
wage earners in families. For example, for married couples earning the average 
manufacturing wage, the marginal tax rate on earnings of a half-time working 
spouse fell from 55 percent in 1970  to 32 percent in 1971. A highly progressive 
individual income tax system contains strong incentives for spouses to equalize 
their earning, labor force participation, and hours of work. 
Publicly Provided Child Cure. The expansion of subsidized, publicly provided 
child  care has decreased  the personal  costs of  labor force participation  of 
Swedish women. Figure 2.9 shows how the number of preschool children and 
the number of  them in publicly provided child care ~hanged.~  Until recently, 
virtually all day care was publicly produced. In 1983,52  percent of preschool 
children were in publicly provided day care, either at day-care centers, in kin- 
dergartens, or in private day-care homes, with “day mothers” employed by the 
local government. Despite the 1980s baby boom, the share of preschool chil- 
dren in public day care had increased to 57 percent in 1992. Many of the re- 
maining preschool children were with parents on paid parental leave. 
The central government used to pay day-care subsidies to local governments, 
depending on the number of children enrolled. Local governments also subsi- 
dize day care. Total public sector expenditure in 1991-92  on day-care subsidies 
was SKr 26 billion. Since 1975, families on average have paid  10 percent of 
5. The source is Statistika Meddelanden, Sene S. Gustafsson and Stafford (1994) present an 
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Fig. 2.9  Preschool children and daycare 
the cost, while the public sector has paid 90 percent. Of the latter, an increasing 
proportion  was paid  by  the central  government over time  (Gustafsson  and 
Stafford 1992). Recently, the system of matching central government grants to 
local governments has been replaced with lump-sum grants. This has doubled 
the marginal costs of day care for local governments. The annual per child cost 
was SKr 62,000, or $7,500-$10,000,  using exchange rates of  the past  few 
years. These large per child fees reflect the fact that care of small children is 
extremely labor intensive and that very high-quality care is provided in Swe- 
den. There are four children per server, a much smaller ratio than the student/ 
teacher ratio in elementary schools. 
Parental Leave and Parental Cash Benejits. Paid maternity leave was intro- 
duced in  1955, when three months were paid. Presently, fifteen months are 
paid. The system encourages women to establish an earnings history before 
having children because the parental cash benefit depends on previous eam- 
ings. It also encourages women to postpone bearing children if  earnings are 
increasing and to space children more closely. Compensation is at least as large 
as for the previous child if the next child is born within thirty months. Other- 
wise, it is lower. The compensation can be obtained until the child is eight 
years old, so almost all expenditure concerns preschool children. Total expen- 
diture in 1991-92  was SKr 18 billion. The compensation is taxable. Assuming 
that everyone has the lowest marginal tax rate, the net expenditure for the pub- 
lic sector is SKr 13 billion. 91  Public Employment, Taxes, and the Welfare State in Sweden 
Child Allowances. Beginning in 1948, the central government has paid fixed 
monthly child allowances to children under sixteen years of age. The allowance 
was roughly SKr 800 per month or SKr 10,000 per year in  1991-92.  Total 
expenditure was SKr 17 billion. The per child allowance is increased by 50 
percent from the third child and on. It is not taxed. 
Housing Allowances.  Housing  allowances  are means  tested,  depending on 
family income, number of children, and housing costs. For all practical pur- 
poses, these are equivalent to a means-tested child allowance. Central govern- 
ment and local government pay 50 percent each. Total expenditure in 1991-92 
was SKr 5 billion. The allowance is not taxed. 
Summary. An approximate estimate of total public expenditure on programs 
for preschool children is summarized in table 2.2.6  Total annual public sector 
tax expenditure on preschool children was SKr 48 billion, corresponding to 
SKr 60,000 per preschool child per year ($8,000). In the spring of  1994, the 
majority in Parliament decided to introduce a child-care allowance. Parents 
with a child one to three years of age will get SKr 2,000 per month provided 
that the child is not in publicly provided day care. The allowance will be taxed. 
Estimated annual expenditure is SKr 3.5 billion. 
2.4  Household Welfare Economics 
Broadly  speaking, the programs described  above have two main compo- 
nents. One is payment from general tax revenues for childbirth and parental 
home care of infants and very young children. The other is subsidized care of 
preschool children outside the home. These policies were designed to increase 
the fertility of  Swedish women and to tilt the allocation of their time toward 
market rather than nonmarket uses (Sundstrom and Stafford 1992). Apparently, 
they have achieved their goals. Some of  the economic consequences for the 
allocation of time are analyzed in this section. Fertility aspects have been more 
extensively analyzed by others (Aronsson and Walker, chap. 5 in this volume). 
The point of departure is a well-known result from the theory of the second 
best. Subsidizing purchased inputs in household production to reduce the costs 
of labor force participation improves social efficiency when substantial income 
tax  distortions  inefficiently  deter  market  work  incentives.  What  has  been 
missed in the prior discussion is that they also reduce the relative cost of house- 
hold goods and encourage socially excessive market production of household 
goods at the expense of material goods. Too many people are involved in the 
household production of other families, and too few are in the production of 
6. Child support advances, another program affecting families, are  not included. The central 
government serves as an intermediary between divorced parents. If a parent does not pay child 
support or the (income-based) support is below a certain threshold, the central government ad- 
vances basic support. The expenditure on this program was SKr 3 billion in  1991-92. 92  Sherwin Rosen 
Table 2.2  Summary of Direct Expenditure on Child-Care Programs, 1991-92 






26  Central and local government 
13  Net of taxes 
2  Excluding housing 
allowances for schoolchildren 
~  I  Preschool children only 
48 
Nore: The table does not give the full budget effects because effects on tax revenues are ignored. 
nonhousehold  goods and  services. This second effect does not  necessarily 
mean that household subsidies are inappropriate. Rather, assessing the purely 
economic consequences of policy requires balancing one distortion against an- 
other. These issues are examined in more detail below, using household pro- 
duction theory (Becker 1965; Gronau 1977; Lindbeck 1982) and the econom- 
ics of the second best (Sandmo 1990). 
2.4.1  The Allocation of Time 
This section sets the basic model and notation (for complete notation and 
other details, see the appendix).  Consider an economy with two classes of 
goods: x represents “material” goods and services that are produced in firms 
and transacted in markets; and z is household goods that are self-produced by 
combining own time with purchased inputs. Consumer preferences over goods 
x and z are represented by the utility function u = u(x,  z). The material good x 
is produced by labor services hired in a market (along with capital and other 
inputs, suppressed here) under constant returns. The self-production function 
for household goods is z =  f (h,  M), where h is own time devoted to the house- 
hold and M  is a market good, best interpreted as the hired time of others. 
Household production is also assumed to exhibit constant returns. 
This specification of  tastes is restrictive in assigning purely instrumental 
roles for time used in x and z  production. Time spent in direct contact with 
one’s own children, for example, is just treated as an imperfect substitute for 
purchased inputs and has no utility value in and of  itself. This specification 
biases the case in favor of work-cost subsidies because parental love of children 
naturally acts to “subsidize” household production; its full implicit price in- 
cludes the opportunity cost of time minus the value of the direct marginal util- 
ity of h. 
Let t be the amount of time supplied to the labor market, w  the market price 
of time, and p  the price of purchased M services. Taking x as numeraire, and 
normalizing the total amount of  time at unity, the time-budget constraint is 
t + h = 1. The financial-budget constraint defining income available for taxa- 
tion is wt = x + pM.  Combining these gives w = x + wh + pM:  full income 93  Public Employment, Taxes, and the Welfare State in Sweden 
(w)  can be spent to purchase material goods in the market, own time for use in 
the household, and the market services of household inputs. 
The Structure of  Demand 
It is useful to solve the consumer's  problem in two steps.'  First, fix z, and 
combine h and M  to minimize production costs. Second, given the cost of z, 
the consumer chooses x and z to maximize u(x,  z). 
The household rationally charges itself the market opportunity costs of time 
in assessing the true cost of z. With constant returns and homogeneity, the cost 
function is 
(1)  q(w,p)  = min{wh + pM + A(z -f(h,  MI}, 
where q(w,  p)  = A is both marginal and average cost of z, increasing in both w 
and p.  Differentiating total cost with respect to w and p  gives input demand 
functions that are separable in output and factor prices: h =  zq,(w,  p),  and M = 
zqp(w,  p).  The constraint for the second problem is I =  x + q(w,  p)z,  where I = 
w  is full income in this case. The consumer chooses  x and z to maximize utility. 
The indirect utility function is defined by 
from which ordinary consumer demand functions x = x(Z,  q)  and z = z(I, q) 
follow. 
Taxes and subsidies alter behavior because they affect net wages and prices 
seen by consumers. The virtue of this roundabout construction lies in decom- 
posing the effects of tax-distorted price changes into two kinds of substitution 
and income effects, one for production and the other for consumption. Substi- 
tute household good demand z(I, q)  into the input demands for h and M,  and 
note that I and q depend on w and p  from cost minimization. Then repeated 
application of the scale and substitution decomposition in the derived demands 
for h and M and the adding-up rule yield the following elasticities (see the ap- 
pendix): 
(3)  qhp =  -  + qzq)>  qMp =  + (l -  ')qzq? 
qh,  = -(l -  ')up  + 'qzq + q,,?  ~Mw  =  + 'r(;q + q~l' 
where q,)  is the uncompensated demand elasticity of variable i with respect to 
j,  8 = whlqz is the cost share of own time in the production of z, and up  is the 
elasticity of substitution between h and M inf(h, M) = z production. The first 
and second terms in each of  the expressions in (3) represent  the direct and 
indirect effects of factor price changes. The terms in up  reflect direct substitu- 
7. I have chosen to formulate the problem in the traditional way, examining choices and distor- 
tions at the intensive margin for the representative household. Bergstrom and Blomquist (in press) 
outline the approach for studying choices at the extensive margin among heterogeneous agents for 
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tion between h and M  in z production when relative factor prices change. The 
terms in qz,  reflect indirect changes in factor demand induced by scale effects 
because factor price changes alter the shadow price of z and change the con- 
sumption demand for z relative to x. The third terms in the wage elasticities 
reflect an additional income effect on the individual demand for z  because 
changes in w change full income. 
Production and Supply 
Assume that x  and M production are linear in their (time) inputs. Write t = 
m + 4,  where m  is time supplied to produce good M,  and 8 is time supplied to 
produce good x. Choose units so that x  = e. Then M = am,  where a  is a 
constant reflecting the number of children per day-care mother (a  = 4 in Swe- 
den). The model should be extended to consider substitution of quality for 
quantity of purchased services in the household, but that is not pursued here. 
To a first-order approximation, the total quantity responses in this model can 
be interpreted as the combined effect of quantity and quality. 
Since time spent in M  or x  production is assumed to be effort equivalent, 
each must pay the same hourly wage w in a competitive market. The competi- 
tive supply price of M  is its marginal cost of production, or p  = w/a,  about 
one-quarter the market wage in Sweden (ignoring the 14 percent share of capi- 
tal costs in Swedish day care centers [Schwartz and Weinberg  19931). The 
marginal product  of  labor in material goods production is 1.0, and x is the 
numeraire, so w = 1 in a competitive equilibrium. At these prices, the first- 
order conditions associated with (1) and (2) are feasible, and their solution 
describes the competitive equilibrium. Think about it as follows. Imagine an 
economy with a large number (a continuum) of identical households. They all 
make the same choice of x, z, and h in equilibrium. Aggregate markets for x 
and M are cleared when the required fraction of workers supply all their market 
work time to x  production and the remainder supply all their market work time 
to M production. 
2.4.2  The Effects of Taxes and Subsidies 
The household/market model is now modified to include government expen- 
diture and taxes (Sandmo 1990). Suppose that the government must raise reve- 
nue of amount g and that nondistorting poll taxes are not available. In order to 
isolate the pure efficiency aspects of taxes, g is treated as exogenously deter- 
mined and redistributed to consumers as lump-sum transfers of x.  It must be 
financed by taxing market income (income taxes), material goods production 
(VAT or sales taxes), or the value of market inputs in home production (gener- 
ally a subsidy). With three market goods-labor,  material  goods, and pur- 
chased household services-and  the requirement that the government balance 
its budget,  there  are only  two independent tax instruments: VAT  taxes are 
treated as redundant here. 
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be the unit tax (if positive) or subsidy (if negative) on M,  the purchased input 
in household production. The government collects revenues from two sources, 
~(1  -  h)  from income taxation, where 1 -  h = f is total time supplied to the 
market sector, and pM  from taxing or subsidizing marketed household inputs. 
The government budget constraint is 
(4) 
The consumer’s budget constraint becomes 
g = T(l  -  h) + pM 
(5)  (W -  T)(1 -  h)  =  X f (p  + p)M, 
from which the social budget constraint follows: 
(6) 
In the competitive equilibrium with taxes, w and p remain fixed at w = 1 and 
p  = l/a  from the linear cost assumptions. 
There are inefficient tax wedges between private and social valuations. An 
interesting positive question is, Given g, what happens when the subsidy is 
increased slightly and the income tax simultaneously increased to finance it? 
If  the subsidy is increased, taxes must be raised by just enough to balance 
the budget after consumers have made all behavioral adjustments to the new 
situation, satisfying their personal budgets in (5). However, to the first order, 
all these secondary repercussions cancel out along the social budget in (6). 
What remains is the condition that socially feasible changes in taxes and sub- 
sidies must satisfy the Slutsky-like condition 
(7) 
In fact, all tax and subsidy variations satisfying equation (7) imply constant 
utility, with the result that income effects on  x and z in consumption are washed 
out in this experiment (see the appendix). 
The behavioral effects of this experiment are found by recomputing the elas- 
ticities in (3) under the additional constraint that, when the subsidy changes 
the price of M,  the income tax changes to satisfy (7). For example, the differen- 
tial dh in the comparative statics now has two terms instead of one: 
dh = [(ah/a~)(dw/d~)(d~/dp)  + (ah/ap)(ap/ap)]dp. 
Making all the substitutions, repeatedly applying the Slutsky decomposition, 
exploiting the constant supply price technology, and converting to elasticities 
ultimately yields 
w = x  +pM + wh + g. 
(1 -  h)dT + Mdp = 0. 
(d  1%  MId 1%  P)bdgetb&nce  =  -  $)[emp + (1 -  e)u,]/(l -  h), 
(d log h/d log P)budgetbalance  = (l -  e)[(l -  $lap  -  -  h)* 
Here, + = qz/Z is the budget share of  z  in total consumption, and uc  is the 
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the subsidy on purchased household inputs and financing it by increased in- 
come taxation reduces the price of  M  seen by  households and increases de- 
mand. Family subsidies encourage households to substitute M for h in house- 
hold production and to substitute z  for x in consumption. Both work in the 
same direction to increase the derived demand for M. They work in opposite 
directions on the demand for h: consumption substitution effects increase the 
demand for own time in the household, but production substitution effects re- 
duce it. The net change in h can go either way, depending on which kind of 
substitution is greater. 
Cost minimization implies that d log z = 0d log h + (1 -  O)d log M. Substi- 
tuting from (8) results in 
The first expression in (9) proves that z must increase in this budget-balancing 
experiment. The second equation indicates how the composition of market out- 
put and the allocation of time are altered. Material goods production and the 
time allocated to it must decrease. Cruss-hauling is a necessary outcome: total 
time  allocated  to household  production  in the economy unambiguously  in- 
creases. Output of material goods falls. 
The change in the composition of household time is slightly more compli- 
cated. From  (8), the  amount of  market-purchased  household  time  (m)  in- 
creases. Because the effects of  substitution in production and substitution in 
consumption  work in  opposite directions on  the  derived  demand  for own 
household time, h can either rise or fall, but, even if it falls, the amount of 
hired household time must increase by more. Certainly, subsidies encourage 
work outside the home. But there is a sense in which all of  it is work in some- 
one else’s home, not in the material goods sector. Parents work for each other 
for taxable pay needed to help finance the subsidies that induce them to work 
for each other in the first place, rather than remain working for themselves, 
“self-employed,” in the tax-sheltered nonmarket household sector. Growth in 
public employment in the welfare state is a predictable economic consequence 
of substitution of state-subsidized services for own-provided services. 
This experiment has been constructed so that economic welfare remains 
constant along the way,  and the resulting reallocations  have no incremental 
social economic value. Nevertheless, measured national income changes. In 
this economy, real national income at constant prices is x + pM = wr = 1 - 
h, so the sign of the change in NZ is the negative of the sign of dh. From (8), 
measured national income increases or decreases as up  is greater or less than 
uc.  When uc  > up,  measured national income is actually reduced by  family 
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2.4.3  Optimal Taxes and Subsidies 
Consider  next  the  “optimal”  tax-subsidy  scheme,  where the  government 
raises the given revenue g  at the least social efficiency cost. We seek tax rates 
T and p that maximize  utility  subject to the government’s budget constraint, 
that is, that maximize 
where G is the indirect utility function defined in (2) subject now to the con- 
straint in (9,  and u is a Lagrange multiplier. It is understood that w and p  in 
(10) are fixed at their general equilibrium supply prices in the economy.* First- 
order conditions are 
(1  1)  -  G, -  v[( 1 -  h) -  T.d( 1 -  h)/dw -  p.dM/dw] = 0, 
G,  -  u[M -t ~.d(1  -  h)/dp + p.dM/dp] = 0. 
Convert the derivatives in (1 1) to elasticities, substitute from (3), and solve 
the two linear equations for T and p. Recalling that IJ. is the marginal utility of 
money in the consumer’s problem, the result is 
(12)  7 = ~‘(k  + v)[eu,  + (1 - ~)u,I/~+u,(u,  -  qZ,), 
p = -u-’(IJ. + u)(u, -  uc)/c4u,(uc  -  qz,). 
Assume that the M sector is small relative to x and g so that T > 0 is necessary 
for government finances. The expression for p in (12) shows that the optimal 
income tax  approximately is a weighted  average of the inverses of  the two 
substitution elasticities, consistent with standard economic intuition that opti- 
mal tax rates are smaller when substitution is greater. 
The expression for p in (12) is much different than the expression for T. It 
depends on the difference between the two kinds of substitution effects. If up = 
uc,  it is best not to subsidize (or tax) market inputs in household production at 
all. A  subsidy is warranted  only when up > uc,  that is, when the ability to 
substitute own time for purchased time in household production is greater than 
the ability to substitute material goods for household goods in consumption. If 
u,  > up,  hired  substitutes for self-production in the home should be taxed 
extra, to discourage their use, not subsidized and nationalized. 
2.4.4  Deadweight Losses 
The formulas in (12) above illustrate the main point of this analysis: that the 
second-best optimality of household subsidies depends on a delicate compark 
son of  substitution effects. Since the child-care sector (M)  is a small compo- 
nent of the economy and so many other factors are involved in the setting of 
8. As usual for this problem, taxes are written in absolute rather than percentage terms. Units 
can always be chosen to normalize equilibrium prices at unity, and taxes and subsidies therefore 
have an ad valorem interpretation. On this, see Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980)  and Harberger (1971). 98  Sherwin Rosen 
taxes and social welfare policy, I present them only to make the analytic point 
as sharply as possible. Loss of consumer surplus measures (Harberger 1964) 
is the  best  available tool for assessing  the  empirical magnitude  of  the re- 
sulting distortions. 
Define the expenditure function S(w,  p;  u)  as the minimum expenditure x + 
qz necessary to achieve a given level of utility. The compensating variation is 
found by expanding S(w,  p)  in Taylor’s series up to second order, ignoring re- 
mainder terms, and using duality theory to express the first and second deriva- 
tives of S as Hicksian demand functions and their derivatives (substitution ef- 
fects only). Converting to elasticities using the relations in (3)  yields 
(13) 
where T and p are interpreted as percentage rates of tax or subsidy. 
Equation (1  3)  captures the efficiency trade-off in a very direct way, depicted 
in figure 2.10. Differential taxes and subsidies cause distortions in household 
production. They shrink the production set to the line marked AB. If this was 
all there was to it, the consumer would choose point A. The production distor- 
tion shown in the figure is measured by the term in up  in (13). However, taxes 
and subsidies reduce the implicit price of household production below its (dis- 
torted) opportunity cost. This causes consumers to choose B instead of A. The 
resulting consumption distortion in the figure is measured by the term in crc in 
(13). The total distortion is the sum of these two effects. 
Subsidies imply that p is negative in (1 3). If the percentage marginal subsidy 
deadweight loss = {e(l -  ~)o,[T + PI’ 
+ (I -  +)u,[eT -  (1 -  e)p]~jqz/2, 
X 
I 
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is set equal to the marginal income tax rate, then all welfare distortions in 
household production are eliminated, and the term in up  vanishes, exactly the 
second-best intuition. However, the subsidy necessarily increases the distortion 
in the relative allocation of time between material goods and household goods, 
and the terms multiplying uc  in (13) become larger. These drawbacks of sub- 
sidies have to be weighed against their virtues. 
2.5  A Deadweight Loss Calculation for Sweden 
Combining income taxes, payroll taxes, and value added taxes, the average 
marginal income tax wedge in Sweden today is in the 50-65  percent range, 
down from 65-80  percent a few years ago, but still one of the largest in the 
democratic world. Taxes of this magnitude cause families to overuse own in- 
puts in household production. Large subsidies to purchased household inputs 
are necessary to correct these distortions in household production. Since Swed- 
ish local governments pay approximately 90 percent of the total costs of day 
care and home time (leave from work) of mothers with very small children, the 
average marginal subsidy also must be about 0.9. 
It is important to notice that the empirical weight of the terms multiplying 
up  in (1  3) for Sweden must be much smaller than the weight on u, bccause the 
share-weighted difference in the absolute values of marginal tax and subsidy 
rates is much smaller than their sum. The share of own time (0) in household 
production  involving small children is substantial,  even for full-time  labor 
force participants. Whatever it is, the maximum possible value of 0( 1 -  0) in 
the first term of (13) is 0.25. Using the large tax and subsidy rates at the upper 
limits of the ranges in the paragraph above implies [T + p]’  = .04, so 0(l - 
0)[~  + pl2  multiplying the term in up  is .01 at most. But [OT -  (1 -  @)PI*, the 
coefficient multiplying g  in (13), is 0.065 with these same tax parameters, 
assuming, conservatively, that 0 = Yz. Furthermore, (1 -  +), the share of mate- 
rial goods in full income, must be substantial, at least 0.75, considering that z 
is confined to preschool children activities here. The net result is a coefficient 
on a, in (13) of 0.25, at least twenty-five times larger than the coefficient on 
up.  Unless up  is extremely large relative to uc,  the welfare loss calculation for 
Sweden must be much more sensitive to uc  than to up. 
The division of the model economy into material and household goods sec- 
tors does not map onto direct econometric estimates of uc  and up.  However, 
estimates can be backed out of the formulas in (3) since the elasticity of market 
labor supply is qw = d log (1 -  h)/a log w = -(h/l  -  h)qhw.  This and the 
Slutsky decompositions imply 
The wage elasticity of female labor supply qw  in Sweden is in the range [0.1, 
0.91  (Blomquist and Hansson-Brusewitz  1990; Gustafsson and Klevmarken 
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and increasing income everywhere are associated with relative expansion of 
the material goods sector and relative contraction of the household sector, im- 
plying qd  < 1.0. However, the declining share of  the household sector has 
been affected by technical changes in both sectors, so the true income elasticity 
probably is greater than what is implied by  trends alone. Certainly it is no 
larger than unity. I use qd  = 1.0 here. Working mothers with small children 
spend as much of their time in own household production of child services as 
in the labor market. Splitting their time fifty-fifty, so that (1 -  h)/h = 1  .O,  and 
using the values for 0 (= %) and c$  (= 1/4) above in (14) gives a linear equation 
restricting a, and a,,  for a given value of q,.  The possibilities are shown in 
table 2.3 in the columns labeled ‘‘uc.”  Each of three possible female labor sup- 
ply elasticities Y3, Y3, and 1  .O within the empirical range, combined with each 
of the four alternative values of up,  implies an estimate of ac.  For instance, if 
up  = 1.0 and the labor supply elasticity is %, then equation (14) requires uc  = 
1.88. It requires that uc  = 3.67 if up  = 1  .O and the labor supply elasticity q, 
is unity. 
The columns of  table 2.3 headed “DWL” show the estimated deadweight 
loss in equation (13), expressed as a fraction of qz for marginal tax and subsidy 
rates of .70 and .90, respectively. State subsidies for child care in Sweden are 
about SKr 50 billion (see table 2.2 above), so qz = SKr 5,500 per child is a 
minimum bound on qz per child because it does not include any imputed values 
for either parental time or material inputs into z production. To illustrate, if the 
labor supply elasticity is 0.33 and up  = 1  .O,  the deadweight loss is .46(qz), on 
the order of  SKr 25 billion, or SKr 32,000 (roughly $4,000) per child. The 
estimates are sensitive to the assumed decomposition of labor supply elasticity 
into its uc  and up  components in (14), but almost all of them are positive. Note 
also that most of  these numbers are large, on the order of  half or more of 
government child-care-related  expenditures.  In assessing the plausibility  of 





0,”  u,b  DWL‘  6Dd  ucb  DWL‘  SDd  u,b  DWL‘  6Dd 
0  3.20  .77  -.90  4.11  .99  -.90  5.00  1.20  -.90 
1  1.88  .46  -1.00  2.78  .67  -.98  3.67  .89  -.95 
2  .56  .I4  -1.60  1.44  .36  -1.15  2.33  .57  -1.07 
3  N.A.  N.A.  N.A.  .I1  .04  -11.28  1.00  .26  -1.43 
Nore: N.A. means that the substitution parameter is outside the economically feasible range. 
”Alternative  values of substitution in production. 
bImplied by eq. (14) for indicated values of up  and q,,,, 
‘Proportionate deadweight loss from (1  3) for T = .7 and p = .9. These should be applied to a per 
child base for qz of  at least SKr 5,500 (see the text). 
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table 2.3, readers might compare them with Hansson’s (1984) larger estimates 
of deadweight losses for other tax distortions in Sweden. 
Table 2.3 reveals two strong regular patterns in the calculated deadweight 
losses. First, the estimated loss falls if up is larger and o,  is smaller, for each 
labor supply elasticity. The reason is that the currently large taxes and subsidies 
eliminate a small production distortion when  up is small and create a large 
consumption distortion when u, is large. Second, the distortion is larger the 
larger the labor supply elasticity because large labor supply elasticities imply 
greater substitution elasticities. Only if up  is relatively large and female supply 
elasticities relatively small are the welfare distortions in table 2.3 of  no eco- 
nomic significance. 
Of  course, substantial portions of the DWL multipliers in table 2.3 can be 
attributed to the high marginal income tax rates, not to child-care subsidies per 
se. Nonetheless, there is evidence that child-care subsidies are too high in Swe- 
den today. Consider an experiment where the subsidy is reduced a little and 
the marginal tax rate is also reduced by the amount required to maintain budget 
balance. Expressing the taxes and subsidies as percentages, equation (7) and 
the budget constraints imply that 
(13  dT = [(I -  ey(i -  e+)idp 
is necessary for government finances. 
Totally differentiate equation (13), and substitute (IS). Evaluating the re- 
sulting equation at 8 = %,  $I  = %,  7  = .7, and p = -.9, the parameters used 
in table 2.3, yields the gradient 
(16)  SD = (a log DWL/a log p)budgetba,mce  = -0.OS71~~  -  0.241~~. 
Since the two substitution elasticities are positive, equation (16) must be nega- 
tive. Therefore, if the subsidy is reduced a little (e.g., from -.9  to -.8,  so that 
dp is positive), the deadweight losses in table 2.3 decrease, and it can be con- 
cluded that the current subsidy is too large. 
The percentage rate of decline in (16) is calculated for corresponding values 
of  the substitution parameters in the column labeled “6D’  in table 2.3. Re- 
markably, the estimates cluster around unity for most possible parameter val- 
ues (except when DWL is itself quite small, where the efficiency gain from 
lowering the subsidy is estimated as much larger because the denominator 
DWL is  itself  small). To  a first approximation, the estimates in  table 2.3 
strongly suggest that the deadweight loss is locally linearly declining in Ipl, so 
long as budget balance is maintained. For example, a 10 percent reduction in 
the subsidy from its current level of  -.90  to  -.81  would reduce the dead- 
weight loss, whatever it is, by about 10 percent. 
Remember that these derivatives apply in a neighborhood around current 
tax and subsidy rates. Were the experiment actually implemented, the gradient 
would change because budget  shares and elasticities of  substitution would 
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(16) is positive, negative, or zero, nor is there enough empirical evidence to 
make an educated guess. Hence, caution must be exercised in extrapolating 
reductions in the subsidy beyond, say,  10 percent or so. Local linearity does 
not imply that the total elimination of child-care subsidies would remove the 
deadweight loss of high income taxation in Sweden! Rather, the estimates in 
table 2.3 imply that the welfare of  the average family would improve if the 
subsidy were reduced because substitution in consumption is heavily distorted 
under current policy. It is entirely possible that, were we to start from a baseline 
of no subsidy, an increase in the subsidy would have improved welfare because 
the household production margin would be so heavily distorted. 
A case can be made that the numbers in the upper-right-hand  corner are 
likely  the most relevant for Sweden today.  First, child-care tax  and subsidy 
distortions largely  work  on the female  labor  supply margin,  and it is well 
known that the wage elasticity of females is much larger than that of males. 
The estimates in the labor economics literature vary depending on whether 
participation as well as hours of work are included, but a value of q,  pushing 
toward 1  .O certainly is well within the range of estimates found over the years 
for women in many countries. The most sophisticated estimates for Sweden 
examine only a restricted range of variation in panel data and are sensitive to 
specification. For instance, sick leave policy and switching the tax basis from 
family to individual accounts are thought to have had a large effect on female 
labor supply. 
Second, there is reason to think that the elasticity of substitution in produc- 
tion, a,,,  might be small at current time allocations in Sweden. The family leave 
policy implicitly recognizes that hired help is a poor substitute for full parental 
care when raising very young children. The argument can be extended to older, 
preschool children by imagining a hierarchy of uses of adult time devoted to 
children, with parents allocating their own time to “higher-quality’’ uses and 
hiring the time of others for “lower-quality’’ uses.9 Hired time in Sweden is so 
large that even more of it would be a very poor substitute for parental time. If 
this is true, the deadweight losses in table 2.3 are half or more of total spend- 
ing, or upward of SKr 30,000 ($4,000) per child per year. 
2.6  Conclusion 
Economic analysis suggests sizable efficiency losses caused by the marginal 
taxes and subsidies needed  to implement the welfare state. Large estimated 
9. Think of a continuum of child-care activities, distinct in terms of  the ratio at which parental 
time can be substituted by purchased time. Denote this ratio by r(s)  for activity s,  and choose s  so 
that r(s) is ordered from highest to lowest. If the relative price of purchased time compared to own 
time is p, the household purchased time for all activities for which r(s) 2 p and uses own time for 
those satisfying r(s) < p.  The marginal rate of  substitution for own and purchased time is p = 
r(s*), and up  can be  shown to depend on  the curvature of  r(s) in the neighborhood of  s*.  For 
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efficiency losses are practically inevitable, given the relatively large empirical 
estimates of  female labor supply responses to wage incentives and the enor- 
mous tax burdens in Sweden today. 
The applicability of this framework for assessing welfare distortions in Swe- 
den has been questioned on two grounds. One is technical:  subsidized child 
care is not available in unlimited  supply to families in Sweden. The other is 
more philosophical: this analysis respects only individual preferences, whereas 
many Swedish economists feel strongly that a more adequate basis for public 
policy must also consider social values. Both points have merit. 
First, if the state rations day care, many women do not effectively face the 
tax-distorted  marginal incentives specified in the model. For example, subsi- 
dized day care is mainly available to women when they are at work. Rationing 
imposes a quantity constraint on the choice problem modeled above. If the 
quantity constraint is not binding, the analysis is unaffected. If it is binding, 
then the formula in (1  3) has to be applied to “virtual” subsidy and tax rates- 
the unrestricted subsidy and tax that would voluntarily induce women to freely 
choose the rationed quantity. Equation (13) itself  is unaffected but must be 
applied  to  these  virtual  or “shadow”  rates  of  tax  and  subsidy. If  Swedish 
women are not getting all the subsidized child care they desire, the appropriate 
shadow subsidies relevant for the welfare loss calculation are smaller than the 
.90 rate used in table 2.3, and the deadweight losses calculated there generally 
are too large. The importance of this point depends on the extent to which 
Swedish women truly are rationed in their use of subsidized public child care. 
This is an empirical question that has not been studied. Some of the relevant 
economic considerations are as follows. 
That subsidized care is tied to jobholding of women in Sweden is not deci- 
sive on rationing because it does not tell  us how much would be used if  it 
were not tied in that way. After all, child care of the kind in question is largely 
associated with jobholding of women in all countries, whether or not it is subsi- 
dized or provided by the state. The demand price for systematic, day-in and 
day-out child care falls off sharply during after-work hours and weekends ev- 
erywhere in the world. Furthermore, most women work many fewer hours than 
men, both fewer hours per week and fewer weeks per year, both in Sweden 
(see fig. 2.6 above) and elsewhere. Rations do not bind in these cases unless 
women are constrained to work fewer hours than they actually do. How many 
Swedish women  are working  less because of insufficient  day care? Finally, 
most of the empirical labor supply responses of women occur at the participa- 
tion decision  (whether to work),  for which rationing considerations do not 
apply at all. The whole point of the Swedish system is to encourage, not dis- 
courage, work. In my judgment,  these factors suggest that the thrust of the 
conclusions above are not much  altered by the possibility  of  rationing con- 
straints: there is no getting around the staggering marginal taxes and subsidies 
in the current system and the substantial wage elasticity of female labor supply 
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The philosophical and methodological criticism of the basis for public pol- 
icy is more difficult to answer. After this paper was written, it became apparent 
that its style and content go against the grain of many strongly held cultural 
and social values in Sweden. There are serious drawbacks when outsiders, such 
as myself, analyze a social system in which they have no personal stake or of 
which they have no intimate cultural knowledge. Any such analysis and criti- 
cism must be assessed in that light. But there also are some virtues: outsiders 
do not carry the same social and political baggage as insiders. They often view 
things from a different perspective and sometimes stumble into asking politi- 
cally incorrect questions that never get raised from within. My own baggage 
is based on my training in an economic calculus that respects individual prefer- 
ences. Social policies invariably include many additional considerations. For 
instance, economists have known for almost two hundred years that tariffs and 
quotas create deadweight losses and economic inefficiency, yet tariffs have per- 
sisted in the world economy for all that time. The fact that social and political 
economic factors affect all economic policies does not eliminate the need to 
assess the size of the inefficiencies  that they create. We  must know the full 
consequences of public policies. 
Many economists of my generation feel that it is our professional duty and 
obligation to point out the possible existence of these distortions, independent 
of their political or cultural sensitivity. Let the additional political and social 
values that sustain these policies be considered with full knowledge of  their 
costs. Many Swedish citizens feel strongly that welfare state policies, and what 
I have termed the monetization of the family, are fully warranted for their pro- 
moting the economic independence of women and equality between the sexes. 
Many also feel that government-sponsored day care has extra social value in 
the raising of children. All these things have value, but the point is that all good 
things have value. How much are Swedes paying for them? How much are they 
willing to pay? Evidently, Swedish citizens regard the social value of the wel- 
fare state and related egalitarian policies as worth the social costs. Neverthe- 
less, it is worthwhile every now and then to try to assess how large the costs 
might be. 
In many ways, and at least in the aggregate, government-provided household 
services replace what would have been purchased in other, more decentralized 
ways without the associated tax burdens. The fundamental manifestations of 
these costs are tendencies to overconsume subsidized government-provided 
goods and to engage excessively in personal activities that are beyond the reach 
of the tax collectors. By reducing the linkages between personal contributions 
to production and claims on social output, the welfare state encourages people 
to produce utility in ways that do not have to be shared with others. The real 
household sector in Sweden is too large on both counts. The monetization of 
subsidized household services provided through the subsidized state bureau- 
cracy increases the demand for publicly provided services and the size of the 
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overall economy. Total output is smaller than it would have been if household 
services had been paid for privately and transacted through the market. 
Appendix 
Notation 
h: time spent in household self-production; 
m: time spent working in market household sector; 
0: time spent working in material goods sector; 
x: market good; 
z: good produced in household; 
M: purchased inputs in household production; 
p: price of M, 
w:  wage rate; 
q: average and marginal cost of z; 
I: full income; 
8: cost share of own labor in household production; 
1 -  8: cost share of M in household production; 
I$:  budget share of z in consumption; 
1 -  4: budget share of x  in consumption; 
qrq:  uncompensated own-price elasticity of demand for z; 
qL;  income elasticity of demand for z; 
up:  elasticity of substitution between h and M in production; 
a,: elasticity of substitution between x and z in consumption; 
t = m + 0: total time spent working in the market sector; 
g: government revenue; 
T: unit income taxation rate; 
p: unit tax or subsidy in M. 
Elasticities 
Equations (1) and (2) imply the following system of equations 
q = Q(w,  p), 
h = H(w,  p,  z), 
M = M(w,  p,  z), 
z = Z(q,  I), 
marginal cost of z; 
derived demand for h; 
derived demand for M, 
consumer demand for z. 
When w  orp changes, optimal factor proportions change. This is the produc- 
tion substitution effect. Factor price changes affect q (and I)  and also change 
optimal consumption. This is the consumption substitution effect. 
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From the Slutsky decomposition, 
z=z"- 
q  y  24. 
Constant returns implies Hz = Q,  = h/z. Since Z  = w, we have dhldw = 1. 
Making all the substitutions, 
*  = H, + (h/~)~q  + (h/z)Z,(l -  h).  aw 
Finally, H, = -(1  - B)uph/w,  and 
so that 
= -(1  -  +)gz/q, and qLI  = ZT(Z/z), 
qh,  = (w/h)(ah/aw)  = -(I -  elup -  e(i -  +)uc  + (I -  e+)qzl. 
Note in text equation (3) that qzq 
in (3)  are derived in the same way. 
Cross-Hauling 
-(1  -  +)q -  +qz,. The other formulas 
The consumer sees the budget 
w*(l -  h) = x t  p*M, 
where w* = w -  T,  andp* =  p t p. Differentiating the budget constraint, the 
demand functions must satisfy 
However, the social budget is 
wh + x  +pM= w -  g, 
where w and p are fixed at their constant supply prices. Totally differentiating 
the social budget, and noting that pM + ~(1  -  h) = g, 
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keeps the budget balanced. Equations (8) and (9) in the text follow from the 
expressions in equation (3) and the condition that d.r = -  [M/(  1 -  h)]dp. 
Text equation (2) implies 
du = dG = --Ad7 -  Az  = -h[(l  -  h)dT + Mdp], 
so du = 0 in this experiment. 
Separability 
It is well known that much of the power of the household production model 
derives from its separability assumptions. For example, the income elasticities 
of demand for h and M are identical, and so are the partial elasticities of substi- 
tution uMx  = uhx.  These restrictions  are relaxed by using the general utility 
function u = u(x. h,  M)  with budget x + wh  +  pM = w. Expanding the associ- 
ated expenditure function, the deadweight loss formula becomes 
+(l -  -  +)[u~~p~  + $8uhxT21 + $euMh(p  + T)2)qz/2. 
Comparison with the expression in the text implies the following restrictions 
in the text model: 
=  = uc, 
$'hM  = up  -  (l -  +>u,., 
- 
qzl = qM[ -  qh1' 
Estimates of own and cross-elasticities  of labor supply and child-care de- 
mand provide enough information to calculate the more general formula above 
along the lines indicated  in the text  and table 2.3. The only such estimates 
known to me are Ribar (1993) for the United States. Using those numbers and 
Swedish tax and subsidy rates yields losses that are of the same order as those 
in table 2.3. 
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